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REFERENCE / ZLIB × LEAN

Findings: issues found in zlib

The work found eight issues in zlib. Each is a defect of zlib itself, is reached through documented use of the functions zlib.h documents, and is shown by a run of the real C. Seven patches fix all eight: patch 0003 fixes two. Six are undefined behaviour or a memory error. Two are broken promises of deflateBound: the bound is too small, and no behaviour is undefined.

Issue What is wrong Calls that reach it Evidence Fix Upstream
inflateCopy compares unrelated pointers inflateCopy compares a pointer into a static table with a pointer into the heap state using >= and <=: undefined behaviour. No wrong result was observed. inflateCopy of a stream that has decoded a fixed block and no dynamic block after it AddressSanitizer pointer-pair check, inflate.c:1383 Patch 0001 PR #1369, answered "Applied"; not in zlib 1.4
gzseek after an initial gzungetc The position is -1 after the push, and the range checks of gzseek64 overflow signed 64-bit arithmetic. gzopen, gzungetc, then gzseek UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, gzlib.c:395, 403, 424 Patch 0002 PR #1361, open
gzread copies from a stale x.next When read() returns some bytes and then fails, gz_fetch returns before it sets x.next, and the reader copies from the old pointer: a heap read outside the output buffer. gzread on input that is not gzip, when the descriptor fails after partial data AddressSanitizer, gzread.c:369 Patch 0003 PR #1405, open
gz position overflow, reading The readers add to the signed 64-bit position x.pos without a bound: signed overflow in gz_read, gzgetc and the gzgetc() macro. With the position near the largest value and bytes buffered, a seek back also overflows in gzseek64, with no gzungetc; patch 0002 alone does not remove this. gzseek to near 2^63 on a device whose lseek succeeds without moving (Linux /dev/zero), then gzread or gzgetc; or the same gzseek, a gzread of one byte, then gzseek back to 0 UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer on x86_64 Linux; for the seek back, UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, gzlib.c:403 Patch 0003, which keeps the position plus the buffered count within range PR #1405, open
gz position overflow, writing The writers add to x.pos without a bound: signed overflow in gz_write and gzputc. gzseek forward to near 2^63 on a writer that does not compress, to a sink that accepts the zeros (/dev/null), then gzwrite or gzputc UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, gzwrite.c:230, 352 Patch 0004 PR #1406, open
gzoffset64 on a negative descriptor offset gzoffset64 takes only -1 from lseek as a failure. With another negative result, the subtraction of the buffered input overflows signed 64-bit arithmetic. gzdopen on a descriptor whose lseek returns negative offsets (Linux /proc/<pid>/mem), gzread, the caller moves the descriptor to a large negative offset, then gzoffset64 UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer, gzlib.c:494 Patch 0005 PR #1404, open
deflateBound is too small for Z_FIXED Broken promise: one deflate(Z_FINISH) call with deflateBound bytes of room returns Z_OK. For 1,000,000 input bytes the bound is 1,000,318 and the stream needs up to 1,008,570 bytes. deflateInit2 with windowBits 15, memLevel 8, Z_FIXED, level 1 to 3; deflateBound; deflate. compress, compress2 and compressBound are not affected. A run of the real C returns Z_OK Patch 0006 PR #1394, open
deflateBound with a gzip extra field of length 2^32 − 2 or 2^32 − 1 Broken promise: 2 + extra_len wraps at 32 bits, the bound is about 64 KiB too small, and deflate(Z_FINISH) with that room returns Z_OK. deflateSetHeader with one of the two lengths, deflateBound, deflate. zlib.h puts no upper limit on extra_len; a gzip header holds at most 65535 bytes of extra field. A run of the real C returns Z_OK Patch 0007 The deflate.c part of PR #1360, open

The verified source is zlib 1.4 (upstream commit 99623ef7) with the seven patches. The runs of the real C were made on 99623ef7 or on upstream commit 757f0527, its direct parent, each without the patch that fixes the issue. Between the two commits the C sources of the library differ only in the version and copyright strings and in the last two entries of the table lext of inftrees.c.

A sanitizer report or a run of the real C is evidence about that run. It is not a proof. The safety theorems are about the patched source.

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READING NOWFindings: issues found in zlib